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I. INTRODUCTION
Change in the law often occurs slowly and without great fan-
fare. An exception to a rule develops and grows until at some
point, the exception overtakes the rule and a new rule is created.
In such cases, it is difficult to determine precisely when the old
* Partner, Forchelli, Curto, Deegan, Schwartz, Mineo, Cohn and Terrana, LLP, Un-
iondale, New York. Adjunct Faculty, University of Phoenix Online Campus. Heather Mar-
tone, a third year law student at Brooklyn Law School, assisted in the preparation of this
article.
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rule was overtaken by the exception and the new rule was created.
Legal commentators sometimes proclaim the existence of a new
rule, and just as it is difficult to determine precisely when a rule
has changed, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the
commentators are describing a change or predicting a change.
This article will describe how the Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States'
represents a fundamental change in the law regarding whether
responsible parties at Superfund sites2 are subject to joint and
several liability. The original rule, set forth in United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., was that responsible parties at Superfund sites
are jointly and severally liable.3 Over the years, the case law de-
veloped a number of exceptions to that rule.4 For example, a
number of cases held that where the responsible parties contri-
buted the same hazardous substances to the site, each party
would be liable only for its share based on the volume of waste it
released.5 A second exception provided that where responsible
parties engaged in different activities at different times, each
would be responsible only for harm created during the time period
while the party was connected to the site.6 The starting point of
the court's discussion, however, was always Chem-Dyne's rule of
joint and several liability, and any other analysis fell under an
exception.
In Burlington Northern, the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit de-
cision that applied joint and several liability in a case that may
have fit into one of the exceptions to Chem-Dyne.7 The Court,
however, did not present its holding as an exception to an existing
rule.' Rather, it went beyond the established exceptions, disagree-
ing with Chem-Dyne on several important points.9
1. 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2006), is often referred to as the Superfund Law, because of the
fund that was created for the investigation and remediation of inactive hazardous waste
sites. Sites being investigated or remediated pursuant to this law are often referred to as
Superfund sites.
3. 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
4. In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988)).
5. See, e.g., In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 902-04.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Twp. of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 316-19 (6th Cir. 1998).
7. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1870, 1877-78 (2009).
8. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1877-78.
9. Id. at 1880-83.
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The key indicators that Burlington Northern represents funda-
mental change, as opposed to merely incremental development of
the Chem-Dyne rule, are three areas where the Court disagreed
with the Chem-Dyne court: (1) the procedure for addressing joint
and several liability versus divisibility of harm;'" (2) the alterna-
tive to joint and several liability, i.e., if divisibility is the rule,
what should be divided;" and (3) whether volume can be a basis
for divisibility when the contamination consists of different chemi-
cals that may have interacted with each other.12 This article will
assess the impact of the Burlington Northern decision on each of
these areas.
II. BACKGROUND
Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or the "Superfund
Law") in 1980.'" CERCLA lists four parties who may be held lia-
ble: (1) the current owner or operator of the facility; 4 (2) an owner
or operator of the facility at the time of the disposal of hazardous
substances; 5 (3) a person who arranged for disposal of hazardous
substances;' 6 and (4) a person who transported hazardous sub-
stances to the facility, if that person chose the facility. 7 These
four parties are commonly referred to as potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs").'" In enacting CERCLA, Congress had two main
policy goals: (a) to facilitate prompt cleanup of inactive hazardous
10. Id. at 1880-81.
11. Id. at 1882-83.
12. Id. at 1883.
13. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2006); Superfund: CERCLA Overview, U.S. EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2011).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) ("Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-(1) the owner and
operator of a vessel or a facility... shall be liable....").
15. Id. § 9607(a)(2) ("[Any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of
.. shall be liable.. ").
16. Id. § 9607(a)(3) ("[Any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances.., shall be liable.. ").
17. Id. § 9607(a)(4) ("[Any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable....").
18. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1870, 1878 (2009).
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waste sites and (b) to impose liability for the costs of cleanup on
those who contributed to the presence of the waste. 9
In addition to listing the liable parties, CERCLA outlines what
costs these parties may be liable for and to whom.2 ° Section
9607(a)(4)(A) provides that the above listed parties "shall be liable
for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State ... ."" Section 9607(a)(4)(B) pro-
vides that the same parties shall be liable for "any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person ...."" Because "re-
sponse" is defined in the statute to include "remove, removal, re-
medy, and remedial action,"23 the "costs of response" that a private
party can recover under § 9607(a)(4)(B) include the same "costs of
removal or remedial action" that the government can recover un-
der § 9607(a)(4)(A).
The Superfund Law makes no reference to joint and several lia-
bility.24 Both the House and Senate versions of the bill that ulti-
mately became the Superfund Law contain language authorizing
joint and several liability, but that language was removed shortly
before passage.25 The legislative history contains two different
explanations of the removal of joint and several liability.2 6 Sena-
tor Helms argued that joint and several liability would lead to un-
fair results, because a party who sent a small portion of the waste
to a site could be required to pay for the entire remediation.27
Others explained that the removal of the joint and several lan-
guage from the bill was not a rejection of joint and several liabili-
19. 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, Reviewing the Rationale for the CERCLA Statute, in
SUPERFUND & BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP § 3:1 (2010-2011).
20. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D).
21. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
23. Id. § 9601(25).
24. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
25. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806. The Senate amendments eliminating joint and
several liability were passed on November 24, 1980. Id. at 806 (citing 126 CONG. REC.
S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)). The House amendments eliminating joint and several
liability were passed on December 3, 1980. Id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. H11,787 (daily ed.
Dec. 3, 1980)). These amendments are discussed by the Chem-Dyne court, which quoted
extensively from Senator Randolph's speech. Id. Senator Randolph stated that "we have
deleted any reference to joint and several liability, relying on common law principles to
determine when parties should be severally liable." Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H11,787
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph)).
26. Id. at 806-07 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement
of Sen. Jesse Helms)).
27. Id. at 806.
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ty, but rather was merely intended to provide courts with flexibili-
ty in determining whether to apply joint and several liability.
28
III. CHEM-DYNE
The Burlington Northern court described Chem-Dyne as the
"seminal decision" on the subject,29 so we will begin our analysis
with that decision. In Chem-Dyne, the United States sued twenty-
four defendants, alleging that they were liable for the govern-
ment's response costs under the Superfund Law.3" Defendants
made a motion for a determination of the scope of liability,3' ar-
guing that they should not be jointly and severally liable.3" The
court recognized that there was "no case authority specifically ad-
dressing this point" and proceeded with an analysis of the statute
and its legislative history.33
Defendants argued that the removal of joint and several liability
language from the bill prior to its passage indicated a rejection of
joint and several liability.34 In support of their position, defen-
dants quoted from the statements of Senator Helms.35 The court,
however, rejected reliance on the statements of Senator Helms,
because he was an opponent of the bill.3" The court concluded that
a more complete reading of the legislative history required the
conclusion that common law principles would be used to deter-
mine when to apply joint and several liability.37 The court de-
scribed the common law rule of joint and several liability as fol-
lows:
28. Id. at 806-07. The Chem-Dyne court relied on statements in the legislative history
that indicate congressional intent to utilize common law principles in determining whether
joint and several liability should be applied. Id. ("[W]e have deleted any reference to joint
and several liability, relying on common law principles . . . "(quoting 126 CONG. REC.
S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24 1980) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph))); see also id. ("Is-
sues of joint and several liability not resolved by this shall be governed by traditional and
evolving principles of common law." (quoting 126 CONG. REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3,
1980) (statement of Representative James Florio))).
29. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009).
30. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 804.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 810.
33. Id. at 804-08.
34. See id. at 806.
35. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806.
36. Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S14,988 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen.
Jesse Helms)).
37. Id. at 808.
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[W]hen two or more persons acting independently caused a
distinct or single harm for which there is a reasonable basis
for division according to the contribution of each, each is sub-
ject to liability only for the portion of the total harm that he
has himself caused. But where two or more persons cause a
single and indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for the
entire harm.8
The court cited, among several other sources, section 433A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as the applicable common law rule."
Applying that rule to the facts before it, the court noted that de-
fendants' motion, which requested a determination of the scope of
liability, was in the form of a motion for partial summary judg-
ment and would be denied unless there was no genuine issue of
material fact.4" The court noted that the site contained waste
from 289 parties and that the mixture of the waste raised ques-
tions about the divisibility of harm."1 Volume, the court stated,
would not be an adequate basis for divisibility, because the volume
of waste would not predict the "risk associated with the waste,"
the toxicity, or the migratory potential. The divisibility of harm
and possible apportionment thus raised genuine issues of material
fact.43 Because the court denied Chem-Dyne's motion for partial
summary judgment,' Chem-Dyne was potentially subject to joint
and several liability.
The Chem-Dyne court left many questions unanswered. First, it
never defined what a defendant seeking to avoid joint and several
liability must show, even though it determined that the burden of
proof on that issue was on the defendant.45 Specifically, when a
court finds that there is no reasonable basis for divisibility,46 is it
saying that the resulting harm cannot be reasonably divided, or is
it saying that the actions causing the harm cannot be reasonably
divided? The court spoke in terms of "risk" as if the risk to human
38. Id. at 810 (citations omitted).
39. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
40. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811. The court's decision to treat defendants' motion,
which asked for an interpretation of law, as a motion for summary judgment is difficult to





45. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811.
46. Id.
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health and the environment was the harm to be divided." This
would suggest a focus on the actions that caused the harm. One
problem with that approach, however, is that CERCLA does not
require any proof of risk.4" All a plaintiff needs to prove to estab-
lish liability under CERCLA is that it incurred costs in response
to the release, or threatened release, of hazardous substances and
that the defendant fits into one of the four status-based categories
of responsible parties: (1) present owner or operator, (2) owner or
operator at the time of disposal, (3) person who arranged for dis-
posal, or (4) transporter." On the other hand, the court also re-
ferred to toxicity, ° which would suggest a focus on the resulting
injury. This focus suffers from the same problem as a focus on
risk, because a Superfund plaintiff does not need to prove toxici-
ty.51 Without clearly identifying what it is seeking to divide, the
court provided no guidance regarding how a defendant can prove
divisibility.
Second, it is unclear why the court chose to treat the defen-
dants' motion, which requested a ruling of law, as a motion for
summary judgment, which implies the application of the law to
the facts. The Chem-Dyne court's decision to treat the defendants'
motion for a determination of the scope of liability as a motion for
summary judgment 2 made it very difficult to prove divisibility.
The court, in effect, created a presumption in favor of joint and
several liability, because motions for summary judgment must be
denied if there is any dispute of fact. The court did not cite to any-
thing in the Restatement or other court opinions to support such a
presumption, and it did not explain why it created this presump-
tion.
Third, the Chem-Dyne court looked to section 433A of the Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts as a source for understanding when
joint and several liability would apply.53 The court, however, cited
section 433A for the proposition that each party is liable for its
portion "[if the harm is divisible and if there is a reasonable basis
for apportionment of damages."54 In the Restatement, that "and" is
47. See id.
48. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2006).
49. Id. § 9607(a).
50. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811.
51. See §§ 9601-9675.
52. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810.
53. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
54. Id. at 811 (quoting § 433A(1)) (emphasis added).
Winter 2012
Duquesne Law Review
an "or."55 Did the court intend to add to the defendants' burden by
requiring both?
IV. MONSANTO
The earliest appellate analysis of the application of section 433A
in Superfund litigation was in United States v. Monsanto Co.
56
Like Chem-Dyne, the Monsanto case arose out of a multi-generator
site at which there had been disposal of a variety of hazardous
substances.5 ' The court essentially followed Chem-Dyne and gave
what would become somewhat standard answers to the three
questions that the Chem-Dyne court left open and that are posed
above.5" The Monsanto court's reasoning made clear that while
citing section 433A as authoritative, it had adopted Chem-Dyne's
small steps away from section 433A.59 Additionally, in affirming
the trial court's conclusion that the "harm at Bluff Road was 'indi-
visible,"'6 it repeated the Chem-Dyne court's statements about vo-
lume not providing a basis for divisibility, because volume says
nothing about the harm created by the combination of chemicals.6"
This indicates that what one needs to find divisible is the result-
ing harm. Because the court found that the result could not be
divided,62 there was no reason to examine whether there was a
reasonable basis for apportionment. Thus, the court drew its con-
clusion by only assessing whether the resulting harm was divisi-
ble without ever reaching the issue of whether there was a rea-
sonable basis for divisibility. This indicates that, as in Chem-
Dyne, a defendant would need to prove both that "the harm is di-
visible and [that] there is a reasonable basis for apportionment."'
Finally, as a matter of procedure, the court placed a heavy burden
on the defendants to prove divisibility.'M
55. § 433A(1).
56. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
57. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 164.
58. Id. at 171-74.
59. Id. at 172.
60. Id. at 171.
61. Id. at 172.
62. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171.
63. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
64. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172 ("To meet this burden, the generator defendants had
to establish that the environmental harm at Bluff Road was divisible among responsible
parties. They [had to present] . . . evidence... showing a relationship between waste vo-
lume, the release of hazardous substances, and the harm at the site.").
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The Monsanto court's application of Chem-Dyne became the
standard analysis of that case and the standard means of inter-
preting the Superfund Law, which resulted in near universal ac-
ceptance of joint and several liability in Superfund cases.6"The
Monsanto court also provided a new policy reason for the imposi-
tion of joint and several liability-the need to make the govern-
ment whole for response costs.66 This policy has become some-
thing of a recurring theme in Superfund litigation67 -one that be-
comes less compelling as the government chooses to sue fewer and
fewer of the total number of potentially responsible parties at a
particular site.6" While the Monsanto court stated that section
433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was the basis for the
law on the issue of joint and several liability,69 nothing in section
433A suggests that making the plaintiff whole is an overriding
goal. In fact, the Restatement suggests that there are times when
it is entirely appropriate not to make the plaintiff whole. For ex-
ample, apportionment is appropriate even when dividing between
negligent and innocent causes, in which case the plaintiff will only
collect the portion attributable to the negligent cause.7 °
V. WHAT IS THE COMMON LAW RULE?
When determining whether CERCLA defendants are jointly and
severally liable, the appellate courts agree that section 433A of the
65. See United States v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 200 F.3d 679, 697 (10th Cir. 1999);
O'Neil v. Warren, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889
F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989); Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 2d
1306, 1309-10 (D. Kan. 2007); United States v. Hunter, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (C.D.
Cal. 1999); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States
v. Miami Drum Servs., Inc., No. 85-0038-Civ-ARONOVITZ, 1986 WL 15327, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 12, 1986); United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-56 (D. Ill.
1984). See also Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under
CERCLA?, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 299, 328-30 (1995).
66. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173 (explaining that "making the governments whole ...
was the primary consideration and that cost allocation was a matter more appropriately
considered ... after [the] plaintiff [was]... made whole") (internal quotation omitted).
67. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 941 (9th Cir.
2008), rev'd sub nom 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
68. If the government identifies fifty potentially responsible parties and chooses to
litigate against only the five largest, it is difficult to argue that each defendant should be
jointly and severally liable so that the government recovers all of its costs.
69. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. e (1965) (stating that appor-
tionment should be made between innocent and non-innocent causes so that a defendant is
not held responsible for harm it did not cause). For example, where the harm that would
result from defendant's dam is exacerbated by an unprecedented and unforeseeable rain-
fall, the defendant is not responsible for damage caused by the unforeseeable rainfall. Id.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts is the common law rule that must
be applied. Section 433A(1) states that "[d]amages for harm are to
be apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there are dis-
tinct harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the
contribution of each cause to a single harm."71
The Restatement provides two examples of a single harm for
which there is a reasonable basis to determine contribution. In
Comment d, the Restatement discusses pollution of a stream by
several parties.73 While we cannot recognize distinct parts of a
polluted stream to say that one party is responsible for one part
and another party is responsible for another part, damages are
typically apportioned based on how much contamination each par-
ty contributed.14 Comment d also discusses a case in which a far-
mer's crop is destroyed by cows that were owned by two neigh-
bors. 5 The result is a single, undivided destroyed crop. 6 The Res-
tatement provides, however, that it is reasonable to divide the
damages based on how many cows each neighbor owned." Thus,
the apportionment is not based on the resulting harm, but rather
is based on the causes of the harm."8 Distinct or separable parts of
the harm do not need to be identified. It is sufficient that there
were distinct actions causing the damage and that there is some
reasonable basis for determining what portion of the harm each
contributed.
The Restatement further addresses harms that cannot be rea-
sonably divided.79 Illustration 12, for example, discusses an au-
tomobile accident caused by two negligent drivers, which results
in a bystander's leg being broken.0 Illustration 14 addresses two
parties that negligently discharge oil, which is ignited by a spark
and causes a fire that burns down a building." Neither of these
harms can be reasonably divided. 2
What is the difference between the cows that destroy the field
and the harms that are not divisible? In their hornbook on torts,
71. Id. § 433A.
72. See id. § 433A cmt. d.
73. Id.
74. Id.




79. See id. § 433A cmt. i, illus. 12.
80. § 433A cmt. i, illus. 12.
81. Id. § 433A cmt. i, illus. 14.
82. Id. § 433A cmt. i, illus. 12, illus. 14.
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Professors Prosser and Keeton note that the cases in which divisi-
bility is appropriate are those in which neither cause alone is ne-
cessary to the creation of the harm or where neither cause alone is
sufficient to create the harm." The stream pollution and cow illu-
strations fit into this category. If one party's cows are removed,
there is likely to be less damage to the field. In such cases, the
harm may be divisible. Where either of the tortious causes would
be sufficient to cause the entire harm, however, or where both are
necessary to create the harm, it is not unfair to impose joint and
several liability. 4
Prosser and Keeton understand illustration 12 (the auto acci-
dent) as a case in which neither cause was sufficient to cause the
harm, but both were necessary. 5 The bystander would not have
been injured but for both acts of negligence working together. In
such cases, it is not unfair to say that each party may be deemed
responsible for the whole injury. Neither party can claim they are
being held responsible for something they did not cause. Similar-
ly, in illustration 14 (the oil spill and resulting fire), both parties'
actions are independently sufficient to cause the harm. 6 If only
one party negligently discharged the oil, the result would have
been the same. In such cases, it is also not unfair to impose joint
and several liability, because neither party can claim that they are
being required to pay for something that they did not cause.
The divisible harms illustrations are all cases in which the
harm is cumulative or scalable. The second person merely adds to
the harm caused by the first. More cows means more of the same
harm, not a different harm from what the other party caused. In
such cases, no one should be responsible for the whole, because his
act was neither sufficient for the development of the whole harm
nor necessary for the resulting harm. In such cases, joint and sev-
eral liability is not appropriate because it will result in a defen-
dant paying for something he or she did not cause.
VI. ALCAN
The first significant steps away from Chem-Dyne and Monsanto
came in the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Alcan
83. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 347 (W.
Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
84. Id.
85. See id. (citations omitted).
86. See id. (citations omitted).
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Aluminum Corp." The Alcan case arose out of the cleanup of a
Superfund site in Pennsylvania, and all of the defendants except
Alcan settled their liability with the government. 88 The govern-
ment moved for summary judgment against Alcan on the issue of
liability and Alcan cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing
that its waste did not constitute a hazardous substance, because
the trace amounts of metals in its waste were less than the natu-
rally occurring background levels for those metals.89 Alcan argued
that because its waste consisted of an emulsion that contained
such low levels of trace elements, it could not have caused any re-
sponse costs.9° Despite Alcan's arguments, the trial court con-
cluded that Alcan's waste contained hazardous substances and
that commingled waste required the application of joint and sev-
eral liability,91 thus following Chem-Dyne.
On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that CERCLA does not con-
tain any quantity or concentration level requirements for hazard-
ous substances. 92 Because Alcan's waste contained hazardous
substances, the Third Circuit concluded that Alcan was a PRP.93
The court also noted that CERCLA does not require the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant's waste caused the response costs.94
Thus, Alcan could not use lack of causation as a defense.9"
87. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
88. Alcan, 964 F.2d. at 255. "In November 1989, the Government filed a complaint
against 20 defendants, including Alcan, for the recovery of costs incurred as a result of the
release of hazardous wastes... into the Susquehanna River."Id.
In response, 17 of the 20 defendants executed a consent decree, reimbursing the Gov-
ernment for certain removal costs, and the district court entered that decree on Jan-
uary 17, 1990. On June 8, 1990, two of the three remaining defendants entered into
a second consent decree with the Government .... The Government then moved for
summary judgment against Alcan, the only non-settling defendant, to collect the bal-
ance of its response costs.
Id. at 257.
89. Id. at 257. "During the rolling process, fragments of the aluminum ingots, which
also contained copper, chromium, cadmium, lead and zinc .... broke off into the emulsion."
Id. at 256. "According to Alcan, however, the level of these compounds in the post-filtered,
used emulsion was far below the EP toxic or TCLP toxic levels and, indeed, orders of mag-




92. Id. at 260.
93. Alcan, 964 F.2d. at 263. Because Alcan admitted that it disposed of the substances
in question, the court reasoned that the only question relevant to Alcan's PRP status was
whether the substances in question were hazardous substances. Id. The court concluded
that they were. Id.
94. Id. at 265.
95. See id.
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The court did, however, examine Alcan's special circumstances
(i.e., that the concentrations of hazardous substances in its waste
were "orders of magnitude below ambient or naturally occurring
background levels")96 from the perspective of divisibility." The
court began its discussion of section 433A by explaining that the
Restatement provides that "harm [is] to be apportioned among two
or more causes where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to
a single harm."9" In its discussion, the Third Circuit specifically
noted that the drafters of the Restatement found that joint pollu-
tion of water is typically divisible.99 The court recognized that un-
der similar circumstances, courts, including the Chem-Dyne and
Monsanto courts, had found that defendants face a very difficult
burden of proof due to factors such as differences in toxicity and
synergistic properties of the pollutants. °0 Despite such analyses,
the Alcan court concluded that whether harm is divisible depends
greatly on the facts and the court vacated and remanded the case
so that Alcan could have an opportunity to develop the facts and
prove divisibility. ' ° The court further concluded that "'commin-
gled' waste is not synonymous with 'indivisible harm."'10 2
What made this case factually unique was Alcan's argument
that there was no need for a hearing on divisibility, because its
contribution to the harm was zero.'° 3The court rejected that asser-
tion, but noted that upon remand "if Alcan proves that the emul-
sion did not or could not .. contribute to the release and the re-
sultant response costs, then Alcan should not be responsible for
96. Id. at 256. Therefore, Alcan argued, its waste could not have caused any of the
response costs. Id. at 257.
97. Id. at 267-71.
98. Alcan, 964 F.2d. at 268 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433A(1)(1965)).
99. Id. at 269 n.27. Section 433A, comment d provides that "[tihere are other kinds of
harm which, while not so clearly marked out as severable into distinct parts, are still capa-
ble of division upon a reasonable and rational basis, and of fair apportionment among the
causes responsible." § 433A cmt. d. "Such apportionment is commonly made in cases of
private nuisance, where the pollution of a stream ... has interfered with the plaintiffs use
and enjoyment of his land." Id.
100. See id. at 269. "Alcan's burden in attempting to prove the divisibility of harm to the
Susquehanna River is substantial, and the analysis will be factually complex as it will
require an assessment of the relative toxicity, migratory potential and synergistic capacity
of the hazardous waste at issue." Id. (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
172 n.26 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D.
Ohio 1983)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 270 n.29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Alcan, 964 F.2d. at 269-70.
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any response costs."1"4 Note what is being divided. The resulting
harm may not be divisible, but court still needs to see if it can di-
vide among the actions that caused the result. Thus, while the
contamination may be an undivided whole, there may still be a
reasonable basis for distinguishing among causes of the contami-
nation.
One problem the court noted with this analysis is that the Res-
tatement divides among causes and a Superfund plaintiff does not
need to prove that the defendant caused the response costs.10 5 The
court recognized that its result brought causation back into the
analysis, but concluded that such a result is consistent with
CERCLA and is the only way to assure that there is some ratio-
nale for the imposition of CERCLA liability. 106
While the Alcan case was working its way through the Third
Circuit, a case with substantially the same facts, but at a different
site, was being litigated in New York. In that case, also entitled
United States v. Alcan Aluminum ("Alcan-PAS"), the Second Cir-
cuit essentially adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit, but
with some minor differences." 7
The Second Circuit began by noting that in order "[t]o defeat the
government's motion for summary judgment on the issue of divisi-
bility, Alcan need only show that there are genuine issues of ma-
terial fact regarding a reasonable basis for apportionment of liabil-
ity."1 8 Apportionment, the court stated, is "intensely factual."0 9
Once the question is framed that way, a defendant does not need
to do much to avoid summary judgment and obtain a hearing on
the issue of divisibility. This does not mean that divisibility will
104. Id. at 270.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir. 1993). "Having
assessed CERCLA's plain meaning, its legislative history, and the case law construing it,..
." the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit "essentially adopt[ed] the
Third Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 261-71
(3d Cir. 1992)." Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d at 717. This approach "will permit such
a defendant to avoid liability only when its pollutants contribute no more than background
contamination." Id.
108. Id. at 722. "[T]he polluter bears the ultimate burden of establishing a reasonable
basis for apportioning liability." Id. (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
172 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983)).
109. Id. (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811).
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be the general rule; it merely makes it unlikely that the issue will
be determined without a hearing on the facts.11°
The Alcan-PAS court gave significant attention to the argument
that dividing among causes, as suggested by the Restatement, was
not appropriate in Superfund cases, because a Superfund plaintiff
does not need to prove causation.'11 The court recognized that
causation was being brought into the case "through the backdoor
after being denied entry at the front door."112 The court, however,
stated that this procedure was acceptable, because it was only
permitting causation as the defendant's burden, and causation
could result in a finding of no liability only where a party shows
that background levels are not exceeded.' 13 In other words, the
court concluded that examining causation as a means of proving
divisibility was not inconsistent with the fact that causation was
not required to prove liability. The court did, however, recognize
the apparent inconsistency that follows from its reasoning, mak-
ing it possible for a court to conclude that a party is liable in the
liability phase even if it caused no response costs, and then that
the same party is not liable in the divisibility stage for the same
reason.
114
The court did not address the Restatement's examples of divisi-
bility, perhaps because none were analogous. In the cases of the
cows and the pollution of a stream, each defendant did essentially
the same thing and the effects were cumulative. Alcan's claim, on
the other hand, was that what it did was significantly different.
Alcan was not arguing that it had fewer cows and thus that it
should pay less. Alcan was arguing that the field was trampled by
cows and it did not have a cow; it had something that was totally
harmless.'15 While the Restatement example of the cows could
110. Id. The commingling of Alcan's waste emulsion and metallic and organic hazardous
substances created an issue as to indivisibility. See id. The differing contentions by ex-
perts on both sides "raise[d] sufficient questions of fact to preclude the granting of sum-
mary judgment on the divisibility issue." Id. at 723. On remand, the factual question
should be-is there a reasonable basis for apportionment-not is there a precise basis.
Otherwise, the phrase "reasonable basis" would be written out of the Restatement.
111. Id. at 721-23.
112. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d at 722. The court explained that causation is
being brought back into the case--through the backdoor, after being denied entry at the
frontdoor-at the apportionment stage." Id.
113. Id. The court then added that placing the burden of proving causation on the de-
fendant was reintroduced as a "special exception," which only allowed it to escape payment
where its pollutants did not contribute more than background levels, as in Alcan-PAS. Id.
114. See id. at 723.
115. See id. at 722. "Contrary to the Government's position, commingling is not syn-
onymous with indivisible harm.... " Id. The response costs were attributed "to substances
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present a means to limit the extent of a defendant's liability, Al-
can did not rely on that example, because Alcan sought to avoid
liability in its entirety, not to merely limit its liability."6
VII. IN RE BELL PETROLEUM
The next significant step away from the Chem-Dyne rule came
in In re Bell Petroleum Services., Inc., where the responsible par-
ties were consecutive owners and operators of the same industrial
facility.117 The contamination consisted largely of one hazardous
substance that had been disposed of by different parties at differ-
ent times."' Two of the parties entered consent agreements with
the EPA; while the remaining party objected to being held jointly
and severally liable for the entire remainder of the costs." 9
The court began its analysis of joint and several liability by not-
ing that courts have generally imposed joint and several liability
in CERCLA cases. 20 The court then addressed section 433A of the
Restatement,'2 ' which provides that joint and several liability is
not appropriate either where "there are distinct harms" or where
"there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm."'22 In a statement that echoes much
such as PCB's, nitro benzene, phenol, dichlonoethone, toluene, and benzene. [Alcan] . . .
contends that no soil contamination due to heavy metals was found there, and insists that
the metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble compounds ... " and were there-
fore capable of reasonable apportionment. Id.
116. The example of the cows is based on the assumption that each cow caused some
damage to the field and it is, therefore, appropriate to divide based on the number of cows.
Alcan's argument, on the other hand, is that its waste was cleaner than the local, natural-
ly-occurring background and could, therefore, not have caused any damage.
117. 3 F.3d 889, 892 (5th Cir. 1993).
118. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 903. The facility had three operators and the evidence demon-
strated that:
Leigh owned the real property at the site from 1967 through 1981, and conducted
chrome-plating activities there in 1971 and 1972. In 1972, Bell purchased the assets
of the shop [chrome-plating business] and leased the property from Leigh. It contin-
ued to conduct similar, but more extensive, chrome-plating activities at the site until
mid-1976. In August 1976, Sequa purchased the [business] assets from Bell, leased
the property from Leigh, and conducted similar chrome-plating activities at the site
until late 1977.
Id.
119. See id. at 894. The consent decree with Bell was ultimately approved on July 24,
1990 whereby the EPA "settled its claim against Bell for all costs, past and future for
$1,000,000." Id. In December 1990, another consent decree was approved, "pursuant to
which the EPA settled its claims against Leigh for past and future costs-for $100,000." Id.
120. Id. at 895 (explaining that "[a]lthough joint and several liability is commonly im-
posed in CERCLA cases, it is not mandatory in all such cases.") (citation omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1) (1965)).
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of the earlier court decisions on the issue, the court noted that
"[tihe nature of the harm is the key to determining whether ap-
portionment is appropriate."123 That conclusion seems to focus on
the result and whether it is divisible, ignoring the Restatement,
which holds that even if the harm is single and indivisible, appor-
tionment is appropriate where there is "a reasonable basis for de-
termining the contribution of each cause to a single harm."124
The court then discussed some of the examples of divisible harm
that are provided in the Restatement.121 One of those examples
addresses "successive harm," such as when two defendants, inde-
pendent of each other, pollute the same stream at different
times.' 26  In such cases, apportionment is appropriate, because
each party caused a separate amount of harm and neither party is
responsible for what the other caused.' 27 It is important to note
that the reason for apportionment is because neither party is re-
sponsible for what the other caused-not that we can establish
with certainty what the other party caused. Instead of looking at
the polluted stream as one harm, the Restatement suggests look-
ing at it as two independent harms: the harm caused by the first
polluting party, which would have existed even if the other party
did not exist, and the separate harm caused by the second pollut-
ing party, which also would have existed, even if there was no oth-
er party.128  This reasoning suggests that what is being appor-
tioned is the act causing the harm, not the result.
The court also noted that the Restatement provides for appor-
tionment where a field is trampled by cows from two or more
123. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 895. "Apportionment is inappropriate for other kinds of harm,
which, 'by their nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical divi-
sion.' Examples of such harm are death, a single wound, the destruction of a house by fire,
or the sinking of a barge." Id. at 896. In these cases, two or more causes have combined to
cause a single result, which is incapable of division. Id.
124. § 433A(1)(b).
125. See In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 895-96. Examples of "distinct" harms are "where two de-
fendants independently shoot the plaintiff at the same time, one wounding him in the arm
and the other wounding him in the leg .... Although some of the elements of damages
(such as lost wages or pain and suffering) may be difficult to apportion, it is still possible..
. to make a rough estimate which will fairly apportion such subsidiary elements of damag-
es." Id. at 895 (quoting § 433A cmt. b) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 895 (citing § 433A cmt. c).
127. Id. (citing § 433A cmt. c). "Apportionment is appropriate, [with regards to "succes-
sive harms"], because it is clear that each has caused a separate amount of harm, limited in
time, and that neither has any responsibility for the harm caused by the other." Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. (citing § 433A cmt. c).
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neighboring fields.129 Regarding the cows, the Restatement holds
that the number of cows owned by each trespassing neighbor pro-
vides a reasonable basis for apportionment.'30 The court found
that the illustration of the stream and the illustration of the cows
indicate that, with regard to pollution, the Restatement views the
quantity of pollution material as a reasonable basis for appor-
tionment.'31 Thus, despite the EPA's argument that there was no
adequate means to verify the relative volumes of material that
each party contributed, the court concluded that the volume of
each parties' waste is a reasonable basis for division.'32
At the conclusion of its discussion of the Restatement, the court
noted that CERCLA cases present some special difficulties with
regard to divisibility, because the Restatement suggests division
based on the amount of harm each party caused.'33 Like the other
appellate courts, however, the Fifth Circuit recognized that causa-
tion is not necessarily an element of a CERCLA claim.'34
After analyzing the case law and concluding that there is un-
iformity of opinion on many key issues, including: (1) that
CERCLA does not mandate joint and several liability and (2) that
the Restatement is the primary source for determining when to
impose joint and several liability, the court examined some of the
issues about which there is disagreement. 3 ' First, the court
stated that the issue of joint and several liability should be dealt
with early in the proceedings, even though some courts have con-
cluded that it is better dealt with after liability is determined.'36
Second, the court overturned the trial court's conclusion that in
129. Id. at 895-96 (citing § 433A cmt. d). "The Restatement points out that apportion-
ment also is appropriate where part of the harm is the result of an innocent cause, or where
the plaintiff is responsible for a portion of the harm." Id. at 896 n.8 (citing § 433A cmts. e,
f).
130. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 895-96 (quoting § 433A cmt. d).
131. Id. at 896 (quoting § 433A cmt. d).
132. Id. at 903.
133. See id. at 896.
134. Id. at 893 n.4. "In Amoco, we noted that, 'in cases involving multiple sources of
contamination, a plaintiff need not prove a specific causal link between costs incurred and
an individual generator's waste.'" Id. (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664,
670 n.8 (5th Cir. 1989)). "Other courts have likewise concluded that proof of causation is
not required in CERCLA cases." Id. (quoting United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990
F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 266 (3d
Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 1988)).
135. In re Bell, 3 F.3d at 901.
136. Id. at 901. The Bell court stated that "[wlith respect to the timing of the 'divisibili-
ty' inquiry .... that an early resolution is preferable," which leaves the ultimate discretion
in the hands of the district court. Id.
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order to avoid joint and several liability, a defendant has to prove
with certainty that there is a basis for apportionment, concluding
instead that all that is needed is a reasonable basis for appor-
tionment.137 Applying the law to the facts of the case, the court
concluded that the defendant met its burden."'38
VIII. TOWNSHIP OF BRIGHTON
The next evolutionary step away from joint and several liability
was the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Township of
Brighton.'39 The land in question in this case, located in Brighton
Township, was "use[d]... as a dump for town residents."40  The
Township used it as a dump from 1960 until 1973, when it was
closed.' Brighton Township argued that it should not be held
jointly and severally liable for the hazardous materials found at
the site, because it did not control the entire site and should not be
held responsible for hazardous substances disposed of on property
that it did not control, and because it cannot be held responsible
for costs related to the cleanup of hazardous substances that were
deposited after it completed its operations at the site in 1973.142
Like many other courts, the Sixth Circuit began its discussion of
divisibility by pointing out that joint and several liability is gener-
ally imposed in CERCLA cases and that in order to determine di-
visibility, the court would rely on section 433A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.'43 Section 433A would not impose joint and sev-
eral liability where there is "a reasonable basis for determining
the contribution of each cause to a single harm."' The issue upon
which there is no consensus, the court noted, is what constitutes
"a reasonable basis."45
137. Id. at 902-03.
138. Id. at 903. "Sequa met its burden of proving that there is a reasonable basis for
apportioning liability among defendants on a volumetric basis." Id. at 904.
139. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
140. Brighton, 153 F.3d at 310. The township did not own the site, but had a contract
with the owner of the site to use it as a dump. Id.
141. Id. at 310-11.
142. Id. at 312, 316-17.
143. See id. at 317-18. "The Restatement says that '[diamages for harm are to be appor-
tioned among two or more causes where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is a rea-
sonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.'" Id. at 318
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1) (1965)).
144. See § 433A(1)(b).
145. Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318 ("Although most courts have looked to the Restatement to
at least some degree, there is no consensus as to what constitutes 'a reasonable basis.").
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The court then contrasted what it saw as two distinct views on
divisibility: (1) a fairness-type approach and (2) a causation anal-
ysis. '46 The fairness approach would look to equitable factors in
an attempt to determine responsibility.147 The causation analysis
is essentially that proposed by the In re Bell 4' and Alcan'49 courts.
The Brighton Court preferred the causation analysis,'50 reasoning
that such analysis is more in line with the Restatement and "Con-
gress's intent to incorporate the Restatement into CERCLA."1 1
The court acknowledged, however, that this analysis weakens the
strict liability aspect of CERCLA, because it is possible that a de-
fendant will be found responsible under CERCLA but still found
to have zero liability based on causation. 15 2  This anomaly, the
court stated, is built into the Restatement.1
53
The court then made some statements about divisibility that are
potentially inconsistent. The court said that "if they are in doubt
[about divisibility], they should impose joint and several liabili-
ty." 154 The court then noted that divisibility would be permitted
where there is a reasonable basis for apportionment based on cau-
sation.' 5 The decision is unclear regarding what doubt is to be
resolved in favor of joint and several liability. The doubt at issue
cannot be doubt regarding apportionment, because "reasonable
basis" implies uncertainty. The court appears to be promulgating
a two-step analysis. 156  First, there is a legal question regarding
whether the harm is divisible.157 If the court finds the harm divis-
ible, then there is a factual issue as to whether there is a reasona-
ble basis for apportionment. 5 ' The doubt that will be resolved in
146. Id. at 319. The Brighton Court distinguished "the divisibility defense to joint and
several liability from the equitable allocation principles... under CERCLA's contribution
provision," stating that "[tihe former is legal, [while] the latter [is] equitable; the respective
tests... should reflect this distinction." Id.
147. See id. at 318-19.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 117-138.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 87-106.
150. Brighton, 153 F.3d at 319.
151. Id. at 318 n.14.
152. See id. at 318 ("This is because defendants who can show that the harm is divisible,
and that they are not responsible for any of the harm, have effectively fixed their own share
of the damages at zero.").
153. See id. at 318 n.14.
154. Id. at 319.
155. Brighton, 153 F.3d at 319.
156. Id.
157. Id. (noting that the standard of review on this issue was "clear error").
158. Id. (sending the issue back to the district court for an assessment of the facts).
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favor of joint and several liability is the legal doubt in the first
step.
The standard set forth in Brighton is thus essentially the same
as in In re Bell-if the court finds the harm to be divisible, then it
should hear evidence regarding whether there is a reasonable ba-
sis for apportionment. If the trier of fact finds that it is more like-
ly than not that a party caused only a particular portion of the
harm, i.e., that there is a reasonable basis for apportionment, then
that party is responsible only for that portion.159
In a concurring opinion, Judge Moore analyzed the use of causa-
tion in divisibility.16 ° She began by noting that language requiring
a causal connection between the generator of the waste and the
release causing the response costs was removed from the bill that
became CERCLA.16 ' Courts have viewed that as a rejection of a
causation requirement, even though a similar removal of joint and
several liability language has not been seen as a rejection of joint
and several liability.162  This leads to an apparent anomaly: a
plaintiff does not have to prove causation to establish liability, but
a defendant can avoid liability by proving a lack of causation. 6 '
Judge Moore correctly noted that what made the Brighton case
unique is that the defendant was potentially being held liable as
an operator, while prior discussions of divisibility have all in-
volved generators. '64 She viewed the divisibility defense to joint
and several liability as a means of "temper[ing] the harshness of
unlimited liability" for someone who did not cause the contamina-
tion, or who caused only a small part of it. 6 ' Because owners and
operators do not, however, directly cause contamination, there is a
concern that issues of equity and culpability will creep into an
159. See id.; In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1993).
160. Brighton, 153 F.3d at 328.
161. Id. (Moore, J., concurring). "[T]he legislative history supports the absence of a
causation requirement, as the final version of the bill ultimately passed by Congress de-
leted the requirement that liability be imposed only on those who 'caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release' contained in the earlier version passed by the House of
Representatives." Id. (citing H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 3071(a)(1)(D), 126 CONG. REC.
26,779 (1980)). This deleted language required a causal nexus between a generator and the
release causing the incurrence of response costs. Id.
162. Id. at 329.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
164. See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 329-30. Judge Moore opined that "the courts should
allow an operator to show divisibility of harm," despite the fact that such a defense has
been used primarily in conjunction with generators of hazardous waste. Id.
165. Id. at 329.
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analysis of the liability of owners and operators.166 To prevent
this, Judge Moore suggests limiting the divisibility defense for
such parties to temporal division167 (i.e., where defendant operated
a facility for only a portion of the time that waste was disposed of
at the facility).
IX. HERCULES AND ROHM & HAAS
While Alcan, Brighton, and In re Bell appear to have created
momentum toward divisibility, most courts continued to treat
joint and several liability as the rule, viewing the exceptions nar-
rowly and accepting only the Chem-Dyne departures from the
common law rules expressed in the Restatement.68 Thus, the gen-
eral rule remained that PRPs were presumed to be jointly and
severally liable.'69
The Eighth Circuit first addressed the divisibility issue in Unit-
ed States v. Hercules, Inc. 7 0 Hercules owned a manufacturing fa-
cility located at the site in question.'7 ' It was one of several par-
ties that was sued for the disposal costs incurred in removing ha-
zardous substances from the site.172 Despite the variety of divisi-
bility arguments that Hercules made, the trial court found Her-
cules jointly and severally liable for over one hundred million dol-
lars, plus interest and costs.
17'
166. Id. at 329-330 (discussing the differences between operators and persons who ar-
ranged for disposal).
167. Id. at 330-31. The court noted:
[Alpportionment is appropriate only where the previous owner or operator presents
sufficient evidence from which the court can determine the portion of harm caused by
the hazardous substances disposed of at the time of its ownership or operation of the
facility, as distinguished from the portion of harm caused by hazardous waste
amassed on the property at a time when the defendant was not the owner or operator
of the facility.
Id. See also In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 902-04 (holding that there was a
reasonable basis for apportioning liability among former owners where only a portion of
harm was caused by hazardous waste disposed of at the time the defendant owned the
facility).
168. See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001) and United States
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by United States v. E.I. Dupont
De Nemours & Co. Inc., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005), both of which are discussed in this
section.
169. See discussion infra at end of this section.
170. 247 F.3d 706.
171. Id. at 711-12.
172. Id. at 711-13.
173. Id. at 713-14.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit addressed divisibility as a "de-
fense" based on causation. 74 It noted that such a "defense" was
problematic because no such defense exists in CERCLA and be-
cause the plaintiff in a CERCLA case does not need to prove cau-
sation.'75 It cited Alcan-PAS, Brighton, and In re Bell as decisions
that had recognized "the defense of divisibility of harm, a special
exception to the absence of causation requirement .... ,176 The
court noted, however, that "defendants are jointly and severally
liable, unless a particular defendant can establish that his harm is
divisible, a very difficult proposition."177 Thus, the court accepted
the Chem-Dyne court's view that a defendant must establish that
harm is divisible,178 as opposed to the Restatement's view that a
defendant must prove either that the harm is divisible or that
there is a reasonable basis for apportionment.
179
In its analysis, the court noted that the "universal starting point
for divisibility" is the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but only those
sections that are compatible with CERCLA. 18 ° The court reite-
rated how difficult it is to prove divisibility and that "responsible
parties rarely escape joint and several liability."'1 - Citing In re
Bell and Brighton for the proposition that a defendant is jointly
and severally liable unless it can show that it is responsible for a
separate amount of the harm, the court concluded that Hercules
was jointly and severally liable.' 8'
The importance of Hercules is thus not a further development of
the exceptions, but to show that an appellate court, fully aware of
the In re Bell and Alcan-PAS decisions, stated that joint and sev-
eral liability is the rule, that it is very difficult to prove divisibili-
ty, and that Superfund defendants are almost always jointly and
severally liable."l 3
The Third Circuit did much the same thing in United States v.
Rohm & Haas Co.,184 just a year after its Alcan decision. The
174. Id. at 715-16.
175. Hercules, 247 F.3d at 715-16.
176. Id. at 716 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930,
934 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995)).
178. See supra text accompanying note 45.
179. See supra text accompanying note 71.
180. Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717 (citations omitted).
181. Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 718-19 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 716-17.
184. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by United
States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. Inc., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005).
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unique issue raised in Rohm & Haas was whether the defendant,
Chemical Properties, Inc. ("CP"), was liable as an owner, even
though it was not the owner of the entire site.'8 5 In the trial court,
CP argued that it was not liable because of the third party de-
fense;.86 it does not appear that the issue of divisibility was raised
in the trial court.
8 7
The Third Circuit began its discussion of apportionment by not-
ing "that although joint and several liability is generally appropri-
ate[in CERCLA actions] apportionment may be warranted in cer-
tain circumstances."' The court noted that courts have relied on
section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the rule of
divisibility, but stated the rule, as so many other courts have, that
a defendant is required to show "that the harm is divisible and
that the damages are capable of some reasonable apportion-
ment."'8 9
CP argued that two distinguishing factors support apportion-
ment in this case."a First, it did not own the entire site for the
entire time.'9 ' Second, most, if not all, of the hazardous sub-
stances disposed of at the property were disposed of by others.'92
The court of appeals rejected CP's arguments.'93First, the court
reasoned that simply stating that a party owns only a portion of
the facility is not sufficient to warrant apportionment.'94 Rather,
the defendant must connect its ownership with facts about what
activities occurred on what portions of the property, but CP did
not make that connection. 95 Second, the Court of Appeals noted
that disposal by others is also not a sufficient basis for apportion-
ment.'96 Significant waste-related activities occurred on the prop-
erty during CP's period of ownership, and CP's argument did not
take these into account in its apportionment argument.
97
185. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1279.
186. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 790 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd,
2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993).
187. See Rohm & Haas, 790 F. Supp. at 1255-65.
188. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1280.
189. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
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The Rohm & Haas court was probably correct in stating that CP
had failed to meet its burden. The real significance of the deci-
sion, however, is that it shows that courts continued to impose a
burden on defendants that is inconsistent with the Restatement.
The decision thus continued the view that CERCLA defendants
are jointly and severally liable and that proving divisibility is very
difficult.
X. BURLINGTON NORTHERN
Burlington Northern ' presented a very strong case against the
application of joint and several liability. The case arose out of con-
tamination at a chemical storage facility owned and operated by
Brown & Bryant, Inc. ("B&B").'99 B&B began operations in 1975
on a 3.8 acre parcel and in 1975 expanded their facility onto an
adjacent parcel owned by Burlington Northern. °° B&B went out
of business, so the government focused its enforcement activities
on Shell Oil Co. ("Shell"), on the ground that Shell, as seller of
chemicals to B&B, had arranged for disposal of hazardous sub-
stances at the B&B facility, and Burlington Northern, on the
ground that it owned a portion of the site for part of the time it
was operated.0 1 The district court held both Shell and Burlington
Northern liable, but did not impose joint and several liability.0 2
"The [district] court found that the site contamination created a
single harm but concluded that the harm was divisible and there-
fore capable of apportionment."0 3 Burlington Northern was held
liable for 9% of the costs based on: (1) the percentage of the site
owned by Burlington Northern, (2) the years of the lease to B&B,
and (3) which chemicals were spilled on the Burlington Northern
portion of the site.20 4
The Governments appealed the district court's apportionment
and the Ninth Circuit reversed.2 5 The court found that the harm
198. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
199. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1874.
200. Id. at 1874. The property was owned jointly by Burlington Northern and the Union
Pacific Railroad Company and the Court referred to them collectively as "the Railroads."
Id.
201. Id. at 1876-78.
202. Id. at 1876.
203. Id.
204. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1876.
205. Id. at 1877. Because both the EPA and California's Department of Toxic Sub-
stances Control both filed CERCLA actions, the Court referred to these parties collectively
as "the Governments." Id.
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was capable of apportionment, but that the district court erred in
finding that "the record established a reasonable basis for appor-
tionment."2"6 Because Burlington Northern and Shell had the
burden of proof of apportionment and did not provide a sufficient
basis for apportionment, Burlington Northern and Shell were
jointly and severally liable for all of the Governments' costs.20 7
The Supreme Court began its discussion of joint and several lia-
bility with a discussion of Chem-Dyne, which the Court described
as the "seminal opinion on the subject of apportionment."2"8 It
summarized Chem-Dyne as concluding that the scope of CERCLA
liability should be determined by "traditional and evolving prin-
ciples of common law."20 9 That approach, the Court noted, "has
been fully embraced by the Courts of Appeals."2 0 The Court then
stated that "[flollowing Chem-Dyne, . . . the universal starting
point for divisibility of harm analyses in CERCLA cases is § 433A
of -the Restatement (Second) of Torts."211 The Court summarized
the Restatement rule in one simple statement: "apportionment is
proper when 'there is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of each cause to a single harm.'"212 The Court then noted
that the basic rules of apportionment were not in dispute by either
the parties or the lower courts,213 and that the dispute concerns
"whether the record provided a reasonable basis for the District
Court's conclusion that the Railroads were liable for only 9% of the
harm caused by the contamination at the ... facility."
21 4
The district court stated that the issue of divisibility was made
more complicated by the fact that neither party argued in favor of
divisibility.21' The Governments took the position that the harm
was not divisible and that the Railroads should be jointly and sev-
erally liable,216 while the Railroads argued that they had no liabili-
ty.217 The district court used the following figures to calculate the
Railroads' share: (a) the Railroads owned only 19% of the surface
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1880 (citation omitted).
209. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (citations omitted).
210. Id. at 1881 (citations omitted).
211. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1)(b) (1965)).
213. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 223 through 230 for a discussion of what
principles, if any, are generally agreed to.
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area of the site; (b) the Railroads had leased their property to B&B
for only 45% of the time that B&B operated; (c) the "volume of ha-
zardous-substance-releasing activities on the B&B property was at
least 10 times greater than the releases that occurred on the Rail-
road parcel;" and (d) spills of only two of the three chemicals that
contaminated the site originated on the Railroad parcel.218 The
court multiplied 0.19 by 0.45 by 0.66219 to find that the Railroads
were liable for only 6% of the remediation costs. 2 0 The district
court then added 50% to take into account potential errors and
held the Railroads liable for 9% of the remediation costs. 221 The
Supreme Court ultimately found that the evidence supported the
district court's allocation and concluded that there was a reasona-
ble basis for apportionment.222
XI. DOES EVERYONE REALLY AGREE?
The starting point for understanding the Court's decision in
Burlington Northern is its statement that "neither the parties nor
the lower courts dispute the principles that govern apportionment
in CERCLA cases ... *"21 That statement is true looking down
from twenty thousand feet. The basic rules on which everyone
agrees are that courts should look to the common law for prin-
ciples of apportionment and that section 433A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts is an important element of the common law prin-
ciples. 224 The Court, however, disagreed with the court of appeals
on several important elements of the "principles that govern ap-
portionment in CERCLA cases."22' Among those are (1) what is to
be apportioned,226 (2) what is the role of the Restatement,227 (3)
what is the role of causation in CERCLA apportionment,228 (4)
218. Id. at 1882.
219. The number 0.66 was based on the conclusion that the two chemicals found on the
property accounted for two-thirds of the overall contamination. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at
1882.
220. Id. at 1882.
221. Id. at 1881.
222. Id. at 1881-83.
223. Id. at 1881.
224. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
225. Id. at 1881-83.
226. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 934-35, 938-39
(9th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
227. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 935-37.
228. Id. at 937-38 (citations omitted).
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what procedure should be followed in the trial court,2 29 and (5)
what does the phrase "reasonable basis for apportionment"
mean?
230
A. What is to be Apportioned?
The Ninth Circuit provided a fairly thorough assessment of
what is to be apportioned, analyzing whether the "harm" is the
disposal of hazardous substances, the contamination that resulted
from that disposal, or the costs of remediation. 23' The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the "contamination traceable to each" is the
harm to be apportioned, as the goal of CERCLA is to recoup the
cost of eradicating contamination.232 Costs, the court reasoned,
are not the harm, because they are more analogous to the damag-
es in tort rather than the injury.2 33 The Ninth Circuit's view of
what is to be apportioned is in line with Chem-Dyne and much of
its progeny, which focused on the result and whether the result
could be divided.234
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, found that the costs of
remediation should be apportioned, thus the Supreme Court is
dividing liability or costs. 235  The product known as D-D was
present on the Railroad property, i.e., there was disposal and con-
tamination.236 The level of the D-D on the Railroad property was
not at a level that required remediation, i.e., there was no incur-
rence of costs. 237 Therefore, the Court concluded that the Railroad
had no responsibility for costs related to the remediation of D-D.238
There is an important difference between apportioning the con-
tamination and apportioning the cost of remediation. If the result
or the contamination is divided, then the potential for the interac-
tion of chemicals affecting toxicity makes it very difficult to find a
basis for apportionment between the parties releasing the various
chemicals. This is because the result does not have separate parts
and the resulting toxicity may be different than the toxicity of
229. Id. at 934 n.16.
230. Id. at 939-41 (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 938.
232. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 939.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 934-35.
235. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 1882-
83 (2009).
236. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1874-76.
237. Id. at 1882-83.
238. See id.
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each contaminant that was released. The Chem-Dyne court rec-
ognized this problem, and thus its theory was that because the
combination may be worse than each component part, there is no
way to appropriately limit each party's responsibility to the part
that it contributed.
On the other hand, if the costs are to be apportioned, it is easier
to find a basis for apportionment, because apportioning costs eli-
minates the argument that commingled waste is necessarily so
different from each individual part that it cannot be separated. In
many cases, the costs related to the remediation of commingled
wastes will not be greater than the costs related to remediating
the individual substances. This is particularly true where soil re-
moval is the remedy. Often, regardless of how toxic the chemicals
are, if the remedy is soil removal, the volume and the location of
the soil will play a significant role in the costs; and toxicity is not
likely to play a role at all.
To illustrate the difference between the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach (dividing the resulting contamination) and the Supreme
Court's approach (dividing the costs), assume that A and B.both
dispose of hazardous substances at a site, and the hazardous sub-
stances combine to form one plume of contamination in the
groundwater. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, there is one
resulting harm which cannot easily be divided, and the goal is to
remove all of the contamination, so joint and several liability will
likely be the rule. Under the Supreme Court's analysis, the costs
are to be divided, where there is a reasonable basis to determine
the costs contributed by each party. Thus, whether joint and sev-
eral liability is imposed will depend largely on the remedy. If two
treatment systems are needed, one to remove A's substance from
the groundwater and one to remove B's substance from the
groundwater, each party should pay for its treatment system. If
one treatment system can remove both contaminants, there are a
number of ways to estimate the contribution of each, including the
incremental cost each adds to the system (some substances are
more costly to treat than others) and the relative volume contri-
buted by each party (the means used by the trial court in Burling-
ton Northern). And, if the two substances combine so that the re-
mediation for the combination is significantly different from the
remediation of the two substances individually, joint and several
liability may be appropriate.
Because of this difference regarding what is being apportioned,
the Burlington Northern Court found that there was a reasonable
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basis for apportionment in precisely the type of case in which most
other courts would have found the result to be non-divisible as a
matter of law.239 The groundwater was contaminated with a com-
bination of the chemicals that had been released.24 ° The Court
accepted the district court's view that this was a "classic case of
divisible in terms of degree."24 ' In other words, more contamina-
tion means more costs and because the increase in costs could be
calculated, the Railroads would be liable only for costs attributa-
ble to them.242 Thus, the Burlington Northern Court could find a
reasonable basis for apportionment when the contamination con-
tained commingled chemicals, without any discussion of chemical
interaction or changes in toxicity.
4 3
Does that mean that commingled waste will always be appor-
tionable? No. Sometimes the combination will create a whole new
substance, the remediation costs of which are different from the
costs related to the individual components. However, in most cas-
es, each different chemical will contribute to the costs in its own
way. For example, at a site in which the soil is contaminated by a
combination of volatile organics ("VOCs") and metals, treating the
VOCs may be a different process from treating the metals, and
there is no reason to require someone who contributed only metals
to pay for the remediation of the VOCs. At other sites, where a
groundwater pump and treat remedy is used, the same remedy
may be used for many of the chemicals. Thus, each PRP's contri-
bution to the costs is measurable, and where a different treatment
is needed for each chemical (e.g., a treatment system for TCE may
not be able to treat vinyl chloride), the cost of the combination is
cumulative and should also be measurable. For example, if TCE
and PCE can both be treated effectively by the same system, then
the cost to remediate a combined plume should not be more than
the sum of the costs of the two plumes. On the other hand, where
the presence of an additional contaminant will either interfere
with the attempts to treat the first or will create a third substance
that is more difficult to treat, the cost to remediate the combina-
239. Id. at 1878-79.
240. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 942 (9th Cir.
2008), rev'd sub nom 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009) (noting that "[t]he different toxic substances
vary in their likelihood to leak and in the manner and speed in which they disseminate in
ground water").
241. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1882 (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. See id. at 1883. The Ninth Circuit recognized that this is conceptually true, but
questioned whether adequate proof had been provided. Burlington, 520 F3d at 942.
243. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
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tion may be greater than the sum of the costs of remediating the
two separately. Thus, in many cases there will be a reasonable
basis for apportionment, and the determining factor will be the
selected remedy.
B. Role of the Restatement
Courts agree that section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts plays a role in defining the common law rule of divisibility.
244
There has been significant debate, however, regarding how to ap-
ply the Restatement's rule. Some courts, such as Alcan, recognized
potential inconsistencies between the Restatement rule and
CERCLA, but decided that CERCLA would determine liability
and the Restatement would determine divisibility.245 If that meant
that causation is not relevant to liability, but is relevant to divisi-
bility, so be it. 246 The Alcan Court noted that this result is consis-
tent with CERCLA and congressional intent, even if causation is
barred at the front door and allowed in through the back door.247
The Ninth Circuit in Burlington Northern, however, agreed with
those courts that held that the Restatement must be modified to
apply it appropriately to CERCLA cases. 24' The Ninth Circuit
noted that causation and the definition of harm were two areas in
which the Restatement needs to be modified.249
The Supreme Court, however, did not say a word in its Burling-
ton Northern decision about modifying the Restatement rule to bet-
ter fit it into CERCLA. Indeed, the Restatement is quoted and ap-
plied as written without question.250 The Court's literal applica-
tion of the Restatement is all the more striking when viewed
against the fact that the Governments' brief argued for use of a
modified version of the Restatement, because they believed that
the policies underlying CERCLA are at odds with the Restate-
244. See, e.g., United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
245. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,964 F.2d 252, 267-71 (3d Cir. 1992).
246. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 264-66.
247. See id.
248. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir.
2008) (citations omitted), rev'd sub nom 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
249. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 936.




ment.25' Specifically, the Governments argued that Congress in-
tended that, as between private parties who have a connection to
the site and the government, private parties should fund the re-
mediation. 2 The Court rejected that position, apparently because
Congress intended common law principles to define the scope of
liability and the Restatement is the best statement of those com-
mon law principles.2"3
It is important to note that most of the courts that concluded
that the Restatement needs to be modified for CERCLA cases did
so in the context of concluding that finding a reasonable basis for
apportionment needs to be more difficult in CERCLA cases.2"4 The
proposed modifications were all intended to make joint and sever-
al liability more likely. The Court's unaltered application of the
Restatement thus must be viewed as making it easier to find a
reasonable basis for apportionment.
Chem-Dyne and many other courts had interpreted the Res-
tatement as requiring both a divisible harm and, if divisible, a rea-
sonable basis for apportionment. 5 The Restatement, however,
provides that harm will be apportioned when there is either a di-
visible harm or a reasonable basis for apportionment.256 The Bur-
lington Northern Court left no doubt that it was not modifying the
Restatement rule in this regard.257 Indeed, it merely stated the
rule as "apportionment is proper when 'there is a reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of each cause to a single
harm.'"2 58
Is it possible that the Supreme Court required only a reasonable
basis for apportionment, because the lower courts had held that
the harm was divisible? That is, is it possible that the Court
would require the two-step process required by Chem-Dyne (first
finding that the result is divisible and then only if the answer is
yes, asking if there is a reasonable basis for apportionment),259 but
did not do so here because the lower courts had held that the harm
251. See Brief for the United States, Burlington, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (Nos. 07-1601, 07-1607),
2008 WL 5266416 at *35 n.16.
252. See id., 2008 WL 5266416, at *39.
253. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1881.
254. See, e.g., Burlington, 520 F.3d at 936 (citation omitted).
255. See supra text accompanying note 63.
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(1) (1965)
257. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1881.
258. Id. at 1881 (citing § 433A(1)(b)).
259. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (citing §
433A).
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was divisible? No. The Court was clear in stating that "not all
harms are capable of apportionment."26 It followed that state-
ment by noting that defendants have the burden of proving "that a
reasonable basis for apportionment exists."261 The Court did not
follow that up, as the Chem-Dyne court and many other courts
would have, by stating that the defendant also has the burden of
proving that the harm is capable of apportionment.
C. Causation
As noted above, a CERCLA plaintiff does not need to prove that
the defendant's actions caused the pollution that led to the re-
sponse costs.262 It is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant is a PRP and that the plaintiff incurred response costs
consistent with (or in the case of a governmental plaintiff, not in-
consistent with) the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").263 For
example, a person who purchases a contaminated site with no
knowledge of the contamination has liability as an owner, even
though his or her actions did not cause or contribute to the conta-
mination or the response costs.
264
CERCLA contains a very limited list of defenses and lack of
causation is not one of them.265  Thus, apportionment based on
causation presents a potential inconsistency between the CERCLA
liability scheme and the common law rules of apportionment. The
Alcan-PAS court noted this potential inconsistency when it con-
cluded that a PRP may be found liable under CERCLA in the lia-
bility phase and then avoid liability in the apportionment phase if
its waste did not cause any response costs.
266
The Ninth Circuit in Burlington Northern addressed this issue
by noting that where negligence law requires proof of causation,
CERCLA merely requires a connection to the site.267 Once that
connection is proven, to allow causation to "whittle their liability
260. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1881 (citations omitted).
261. Id.
262. See supra text accompanying note 105.
263. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (West 2006). A governmental entity may collect as long as its
costs are "not inconsistent with" the NCP, while a private party must prove that its costs
are consistent with the NCP. Id.
264. See id. §§ 9601-9675.
265. Id.
266. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 723 (2d Cir. 1993).
267. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 938 (9th Cir.
2008) (citations omitted), rev'd sub nom 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
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down" would violate the basic structure of CERCLA, because one
of the concepts underlying CERCLA is that cleanup costs should
be borne by a person with some connection to the site, rather than
imposing those costs on the government.268
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Ninth Circuit, saw no dif-
ficulty in imposing a significant portion of the costs on the gov-
ernment, rather than imposing those costs on a party to whom
those costs are not attributable.269 Apportionment thus can and
did allow a defendant to "whittle their liability down."270
The Ninth Circuit is correct in pointing out that apportionment
based on causation may conflict with the CERCLA liability
scheme, particularly where one of the parties is an owner of the
contaminated property. It is difficult to say that an owner who
purchased the property after the contamination occurred caused
any of the contamination. Nevertheless, a person who owned the
site during the entire disposal period and benefited financially
from the contamination may have the necessary connection to the
site that justifies imposing liability for the whole harm.2
The Supreme Court, thus, for the most part, did not speak in
terms of what was caused by each party. Rather, it permitted ap-
portionment based on what was "attributable" to the parties. 2
Contamination that results during the defendant's period of own-
ership may be attributable to the defendant even though the de-
fendant did not cause the contamination. 273 This means that the
same contamination may be attributable to more than one party,
but sorting that out is the role of contribution claims among de-
fendants.274  It is not the role of apportionment. Thus, the Su-
preme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit regarding the poli-
cies underlying CERCLA and, consequently, whether the Res-
268. See, e.g., Burlington, 520 F.3d at 945.
269. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880-84
(2009).
270. Id.
271. The owner may have a contribution claim based on § 113, which would permit dis-
cussion of equitable principles.
272. See Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1880-84.
273. Section 9607(a) provides that an owner has liability. Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (West 2006). See
Burlington, 520 F.3d at 945 (The court concluded that "[a] landowner PRP need not be
involved at all in the disposal of hazardous chemicals and so will often have no information
concerning that disposal or its impact.").
274. When waste is delivered to a facility, the person who arranged for disposal, the
owner of the facility, and the operator all have potential liability based on that disposal. §
9607(a). Section 9613(f) addresses the possible contribution claims between those parties.
Id. at § 9613(f).
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tatement needed to be modified to be used in CERCLA actions. In
practice, where the Restatement clearly apportions among causes,
the Court recognized a rule whereby a court apportions among
those to whom the contamination may be attributable.
D. How Precise Must the Evidence Be?
The Court also differed with the Ninth Circuit regarding how
precise the evidence must be to support apportionment. 5  The
Ninth Circuit noted "a lack of sufficient data to establish the pre-
cise proportion of contamination that occurred on the relative por-
tions of the . . . facility ... .,,17' The Court, however, found that
while precision could not be achieved, the trial court was reasona-
ble in assessing that the Railroads' parcel did not contribute more
than ten percent of the contamination and in using estimates that
were then adjusted upward to account for potential errors. 7  The
result was less a conclusion that 9% of the waste was attributable
to the Railroads than a conclusion that no more than 9% could be
attributable to the Railroads.278
Note that regarding how precise the evidence needs to be, the
difference of opinion between the courts was not great. The Ninth
Circuit recognized that precision is not required, stating that "it is
neither unusual nor fatal to the validity of the resulting allocation
that an apportionment determination includes estimates of con-
tribution to contamination based on extrapolation .... The
difference between the courts may actually be more in the way
that the parties provided their proof. Burlington Northern's ex-
perts focused on what contamination could not be attributable to
Burlington Northern."' The Court of Appeals responded by say-
ing that more evidence regarding what Burlington Northern is
responsible for was needed.8 ' The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, accepted as a reasonable basis, the idea that if most of the
harm cannot be attributable to one party, then it is reasonable to
275. See Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
276. Id. at 1882.
277. Id. at 1882-84.
278. See id.
279. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 943 n.28 (9th Cir.
2008) (citations omitted), rev'd sub nom 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
280. See United States v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., Nos. CV-F-92-5068
OWW, CV-F-96-6226 OWW, CV-F-96-6228 OWW, 2003 WL 25518047, at *87 (E.D. Cal.
July 15, 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
281. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 927 n.18.
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apportion it in a manner that attributes less than half of the
waste to that party.282 Thus, what a party cannot be responsible
for can be used to create an inference regarding what that party's
share should be. Or more precisely, what a party cannot be re-
sponsible for creates a cap on their share.
E. What is a Reasonable Basis for Apportionment?
The issue of what constitutes a reasonable basis for apportion-
ment is probably the sharpest difference of opinion between the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit noted
that the district court "relied on the simplest of considerations,"
such as "percentage of land area [owned], time of ownership, and
types of hazardous products."2 " These considerations, the court of
appeals concluded, were not sufficiently related to the issue of how
much contamination was attributable to each party.2 s4
The court of appeals dealt with each consideration separately.
First, regarding land area, the court relied on the Rohm & Haas
case for the proposition that "simply showing that one owns only a
portion of the facility is not sufficient to warrant apportionment,"
using that to eliminate use of land area as a basis for apportion-
ment.28 5 While the court of appeals was correct that land area
alone says very little about who is responsible for what contami-
nation, the Supreme Court correctly pointed out that land area
can play a role in determining who is or is not responsible for cer-
tain contamination.2 6 For example, if B&B released hazardous
substances on B&B's property, it is very difficult to attribute the
costs related to that release to the Railroads. Thus, the Rohm &
Haas court's conclusion that land area alone is not a reasonable
basis for apportionment says nothing about whether land area
combined with other factors creates a reasonable basis for appor-
tionment.
Next, the court of appeals dealt with the period of ownership
and again found it to be unrelated to responsibility.8 7 If there was
evidence of how much waste was released on a yearly basis, the
282. See Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
283. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 943.
284. Id. at 943-44.
285. Id. at 943 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2
F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled by United States v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours &
Co. Inc., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1883 (citations omitted).
287. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 945.
118 Vol. 50
Joint and Several Liability
court noted, that information could be helpful in apportionment.2 8
Additionally, the court noted that if more information were avail-
able, it would be reasonable to hold that the Railroads are not re-
sponsible for releases prior to the time that they became owner of
a part of the site.289
On this issue, what is a reasonable basis is closely related to the
issue of how precise the evidence must be. To the court of appeals,
there was no specific evidence on year-to-year contamination, and
that ended the analysis. 29" The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, was willing to accept estimates and then adjust for possible
errors.29 1 Just as in the Restatement's case of the cows destroying
the crops, where the assumption is that the cows are approximate-
ly equal and the Restatement does not require examination of the
size, age, and health of each party's cows to determine apportion-
ment,292 here the Court is willing to accept reasonable estimates in
place of precision.
The next consideration that the court of appeals analyzed was
the use of the type of chemical product in the apportionment
process.293 All of the products were used on the Railroads' proper-
ty.294 All were released on the Railroads' property.29 Thus, the
Railroads should have responsibility for all of the products. The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, looked to the costs.2 96 There
was no D-D on the Railroads' parcel in concentrations requiring
remediation. 297 Thus, the Railroads could not be responsible for
costs related to the spill or release of D-D.29" Here, what was be-
ing allocated played an important role in determining what consti-
tutes a reasonable basis for apportionment. When costs are being
allocated (rather than trying to allocate among components of
harm), the Court could examine whether the Railroads could be
held liable for the costs related to D-D.299 Because none of the
spills of D-D on the Railroads' property resulted in cleanup costs,
288. See id (citation omitted).
289. Id. (citation omitted).
290. See id. (citation omitted).
291. See Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1965)
293. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 945.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-84.





the Railroads were not liable for costs related to the remediation
of D-D.3 °°
The Governments argued that joint and several liability was
appropriate, because this was a case in which neither party's ac-
tivities were necessary, as in the Restatement's illustration of the
fire."0' The Governments argued that because there was one
plume of contaminated groundwater that contained several con-
taminants, and the remediation may have been the same even if
either party's contribution was removed, joint and several liability
was appropriate.3 0 2  That argument, however, misinterprets the
crucial distinction between when the two events are cumulative
(and joint and several liability is not applied) and when they are
interactive (and joint and several liability is applied).
In the illustration of the fire, the result is the same regardless of
whether there was one act of negligence or two.3"3 There is only
one fire and it causes the same destruction; the second act of neg-
ligence adds nothing.0 4 In Burlington Northern, on the other
hand, the district court saw it as a "classic divisible in terms of
degree" case,30 5 and the Supreme Court agreed.3 6 This would in-
dicate that the Court saw the contamination as cumulative. The
groundwater remedy was a granulated activated carbon system,
which is a "mass-driven removal scheme."30 7 That means that the
cost of operating the system is directly related to the mass of con-
taminants. Thus, contamination would be cumulative. In such
cases, the situation is more analogous to the cows, and each party
is responsible only for its part.
300. See id.
301. See Brief for the United States, supra note 251, 2008 WL 5266416, at *35-43 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. i (1965)).
302. Id., 2008 WL 5266416, at *35-36.
303. § 433A cmt. i, illus. 14. illustration 14 states that:
A Company and B Company each negligently discharge oil into a stream. The oil
floats on the surface and is ignited by a spark from an unknown source. The fire
spreads to C's barn, and burns it down. C may recover a judgment for the full
amount of his damages against A Company, or B Company, or both of them.
See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
304. See § 433A cmt. i, illus. 14.
305. Burlington, 129 S. Ct. at 1882 (citation omitted).
306. Id. at 1885-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
307. Reply Brief for Petitioners Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. and Union Pacific R.R.
Co., Burlington, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (Nos. 07-1601, 07-1607), 2009 WL 1261924, at *19 (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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F. So What is the Rule That Results from This Decision?
If there is a reasonable basis for allocation of harms, Superfund
defendants will not be subject to joint and several liability.08 A
reasonable basis does not have to be a precise or certain basis; it
only has to be a reasonable basis."9 The standard is a fairly low
one, as the Supreme Court upheld a trial court finding of reasona-
ble basis," ' even though neither party presented any theory re-
garding a reasonable basis for allocation.
To establish a reasonable basis for allocation, a defendant does
not need specific evidence regarding what he or she is responsible
for.3 ' It is enough that the defendant can show through volume-
tric evidence, geographic evidence, or some combination thereof,
what contamination the defendant cannot be responsible for.312
Once that is established, rather than impose joint and several lia-
bility, the court should impose several liability and relieve the de-
fendant of the obligation to pay for costs that cannot be attributed
to said defendant.1 3
There can be a reasonable basis for allocation even where mul-
tiple chemicals mix together and create one plume of contami-
nated groundwater.314 Does that mean that the Chem-Dyne theory
that holds that a chemical interaction creates an indivisible harm
is no longer applicable? No. It may be that some chemical inte-
ractions create a harm that is distinct from the harm that would
have been created by any of the chemicals alone. In Alcan, for
example, joint and several liability was probably appropriate, be-
cause the trial court on remand found that Alcan's relatively be-
nign emulsion enhanced the ability of the other contaminants to
migrate, resulting in contamination that would not have occurred,
but for the interaction.31 5 Because neither cause was sufficient
and both were necessary, joint and several liability may have been
appropriate."'
Where there is a reasonable basis for allocation, each is allo-
cated a share of the costs attributable to their contamination, not
308. Burlington, 129 S. Ct.at 1881.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 283-92.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 219-55.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 279-313.
312. Burlington, 129 S. Ct at 1881-83.
313. Id.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 87-116.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 87-116.
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a share of the contamination. 17 Does that mean that the volume
of waste contributed alone is never a reasonable basis for alloca-
tion? No. Volume alone can be a reasonable basis in cases like In
re Bell, where each of the PRPs engaged in essentially the same
activity and each was alleged to have contributed the same con-
taminant."' Additionally, volume alone can be a reasonable basis
where all of the parties are arrangers and each party's waste is
merely cumulative. 19 Volume alone would not have provided a
reasonable basis for allocation in Burlington Northern, however,
because Burlington Northern was an owner, and an owner and
arranger will both have responsibility for the same waste.
Reasonable basis is a fact-based analysis 32 -thus we cannot list
all of the circumstances in which there will be a reasonable basis
for allocation. It is important to note, however, that there will be
times when the same waste is attributable to more than one party
and thus, a party can be responsible for the whole even without
the interaction of causes discussed by the Chem-Dyne court. 321 For
example, where one party is an owner for the entire period of
waste disposal and the other party is an operator, joint and sever-
al liability may be appropriate. All of the waste disposal can be
attributed to the owner, because all of the waste disposal was on
his or her property during his or her period of ownership. Similar-
ly, all of the waste disposal may be attributed to the generator,
because he or she generated and disposed of the waste. There
may be equitable reasons to treat the different PRP's differently,
but equitable factors play a role in the contribution claims among
liable parties, not in the decision regarding whether to impose
joint and several liability.322
Finally, because it is a fact based analysis, the more facts a de-
fendant can provide to indicate a reason for allocation, the better.
Note how ownership of only part of the contaminated property
played a role in Burlington Northern.323 The Ninth Circuit correct-
ly pointed out that ownership of only part of the property cannot
alone be a reasonable basis for allocation.324 An argument that A
317. See supra text accompanying notes 235-39.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 117-38.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 238-39.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 29-55.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 146-53.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 219-55.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 285-92.
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owned only half the contaminated property and should not be re-
sponsible for more than half the costs is entirely unpersuasive,
because it is possible that most of the contamination is on the por-
tion of the property owned by A. The key to understanding what
A could be responsible for is not what A owned, but what hap-
pened on the property A owned. In Burlington Northern, the
Court recognized that the combination of ownership of only part of
the contaminated property, ownership for only part of the time,
less handling of hazardous substances on the part owned by the
Railroads, and less contamination on the Railroads' property al-
lowed the Court to conclude that the Railroads could not be re-
sponsible for most of the costs.32
In the absence of facts regarding what the Railroads were re-
sponsible for, the Court accepted an allocation based primarily on
what the Railroads could not be responsible for. Because many
Superfund sites were contaminated long ago, records will often be
difficult to find. There will, therefore, be many cases in which a
party does not have a reasonable basis for establishing his or her
share, but can point out things that he or she clearly did not do.
Based on the Court's decision in Burlington Northern, that should
be sufficient to limit a defendant's liability.
XII. CONCLUSION
After the Chem-Dyne decision, nearly all courts and commenta-
tors concluded that PRPs at Superfund sites were jointly and sev-
erally liable. The first significant move away from joint and sev-
eral liability came in the Alcan decisions, in which the Second and
Third Circuits recognized an "exception" to joint and several liabil-
ity where a PRP sent such small quantities of hazardous sub-
stances to a site that its waste may not have caused any response
costs.32 In a sense, if the PRP did not cause any of the response
costs, it would be unfair to impose joint and several liability and
make that PRP potentially responsible for all of the costs.
The next significant step away from joint and several liability
came in the In re Bell decision, where the Fifth Circuit recognized
that there was a reasonable basis for apportioning liability be-
tween consecutive owners and operators of the same facility who
disposed of the same hazardous substances, but at different
325. See supra text accompanying notes 219-55.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 87-116.
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times. 27 The Sixth Circuit then created an "exception" to the rule
of joint and several liability in its Brighton decision, where the
court recognized that a person who is alleged to have liability as
an owner or operator for a portion of the disposal period should
not be responsible for costs related to waste disposed of at the fa-
cility after it no longer had any connection to the facility.3 28 Bur-
lington Northern can be seen as completing the process, whereby
the former exceptions created a rule based on apportionment, and
cases in which joint and several liability are applied will be excep-
tions to that new rule.
There is a large gap between Chem-Dyne and its presumption
that PRPs are jointly and severally liable,329 and Burlington
Northern and its conclusion that parties who submitted no argu-
ments in support of any basis for allocation can nevertheless be
found to have a reasonable basis for allocation.33 After Burling-
ton Northern, many courts will be addressing the issue of a "rea-
sonable basis for allocation" for the first time, because commingled
waste was generally seen as indivisible. If trial courts pay close
attention to the Burlington Northern Court's reasoning and to the
facts of each case, joint and several liability in CERCLA actions
will become the exception and not the rule.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 117-38.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 139-67.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 29-55.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 198-222.
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